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Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the 
Immigration Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the 
Sixth Amendment 
Yolanda Vazquez* 
“The law and its institutions change as social conditions change.  They must change 
if they are to preserve, much less advance, the political and social values from which 
they derive their purposes and their life.  This is true of the most important of legal 
institutions, the profession of law.  The profession, too, must change when conditions 
change in order to preserve and advance the social values that are its reasons for 
being.” 
– Cheatham1 
“Well, if misadvice is ineffective but no advice is not, then I don’t think we should 
have trainings.”  
– Public Defender Training Director 
INTRODUCTION 
A twenty-one year old college student walks into a criminal courtroom, 
charged with possession of thirty-one grams of marijuana.  The defendant meets with 
an attorney who informs him that the government is offering a plea to the marijuana 
charge for time considered served, the two days the defendant had served before 
being released from custody.  The defendant accepts the plea and walks out of the 
courtroom. Six months later, the defendant is put into immigration custody and 
found deportable based on his guilty plea.  At the time of his plea, however, the 
defendant did not know that (1) he would be subject to deportation by pleading 
guilty to the charge2 and (2) had he instead plead guilty to possession of thirty grams 
or less of marijuana, he would not have been subject to deportation.3  The attorney 
 
*Clinical Supervisor and Lecturer, University of Pennsylvania School of Law.  I thank the following 
people for their support, ideas, and comments on earlier drafts of this article:  Stephanos Bibas, Michael 
Carroll, Andrea Dennis, Roger Fairfax, Kris Henning, Stephen Legomsky, JC Lore, Beth Lyon, Karla 
McKanders, Greg Magarian, Eric J. Miller, Michael Pinard, and Ngai Pindell.  I also thank my research 
assistants, Kathlyn Castilla and Sarah Sheffield, for their excellent assistance with this article.  
1. Elliott E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual 
Lawyer and the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438, 440 (1965). 
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 2008 § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
3. Id. (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State…, relating to a controlled substance (as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 
30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”). 
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neither informed him about the possibility of deportation, nor did the attorney 
negotiate a plea to reflect an amount of 30 grams of marijuana, only one gram lower, 
which would have prevented his deportation.4  The defendant was a lawful 
permanent resident who had been living in the United States since the age of 
eighteen months; he did not speak, read, or write in the language of the country 
where he was born, and had no family outside of the United States.  
Noncitizens across the country are being convicted in criminal courts 
without knowing the impact their criminal conviction will have on their immigration 
status, both in the present and in the future.  In 2009 alone, approximately 128,000 
noncitizens convicted of crimes were removed from the United States.5  In addition 
to the defendants, their families are affected by removal proceedings.  Between 1998 
and 2007, more than 100,000 parents of United States citizen children were 
removed.6  Since 1996, 1.6 million families have been separated by removal.7   
Many jurisdictions have addressed what place, if any, immigration law has 
in the criminal courtroom.8  Specifically, whether or not an attorney has a duty to 
advise his or her client about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.  
There is a jurisdictional split among federal district and state courts, and deep 
division on this issue persists nationwide.  Among state and federal courts with 
decisions on the issue, there is currently a 27-5 split on whether defense counsel has 
a duty to advise noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction.9  The vast majority of courts hold that an attorney has no duty to advise a 
client on the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction under the Sixth 
Amendment.10  Three minority courts believe that there is an affirmative duty to 
 
4. Id. 
5. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT 4, tbl. 4 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2010,0819-
dhs.pdf. 
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REMOVAL INVOLVING 
ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN 1 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-15_Jan09.pdf.   
7. Michael E. Fix & Wendy Zimmerman, ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: MIXED-STATUS FAMILIES 
IN AN ERA OF REFORM, URBAN INST. 1 (1999), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
409100.pdf.   
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.-C.   
9. See discussion infra Part II.A. and notes 10-12. 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Along with 
numerous other courts of appeals, we have held that deportation is only a collateral concomitant to 
criminal conviction. Counsel’s failure to advise a defendant of a collateral consequence is a legally 
insufficient ground for a plea withdrawal.”) (citation omitted); see also Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 
548 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2008) (deciding that (1) there was no duty to advise of negative 
immigration consequences and (2) merely stating that negative immigration consequences may arise from 
a conviction and recommending consultation with an attorney specializing in immigration did not amount 
to a misleading statement under the Kwan or Couto analysis); Creary v. Mukasey, 271 F. App’x 127, 128 
(2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n attorney’s failure to inform a defendant of the immigration consequences of guilty 
plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, but that an attorney’s affirmative 
misrepresentation…can constitute ineffective assistance [of counsel].”) (citation omitted); United States v. 
Sanchez, 247 F. App’x 951, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court’s failure to advise 
defendant of immigration consequences of his plea did not render plea other than knowing and voluntary); 
Yong Wong Park v. United States, 222 F. App’x 82 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that failure to advise of 
deportation consequences is not ineffective counsel); United States v. Jacquez, 191 F. App’x. 583, 584 
(9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that his attorney’s failure to explain immigration 
consequences led to an involuntary guilty plea); Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(finding that despite the attorney providing erroneous advice on deportation consequences, the defendant 
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failed to show that this information would have changed his plea); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 
1257 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to advise petitioner of possibility 
of deportation as collateral consequence of pleading guilty); United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 
(9th Cir. 2003) (stating that counsel’s failure to advise of immigration consequences, without more, does 
not amount to ineffective assistance); Gumangan v. United States, 254 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(citing with approval to Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ conclusion that failure to advise a defendant of the 
prospect of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Russo v. United States, No. 
97-2891, 1999 WL 164951, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 1999) (“[C]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for the 
mere  failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a plea, such as deportation.”); United 
States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that an attorney’s failure to inform client of 
possible deportation is not ineffective assistance of counsel; rather, the defendant must show that there 
was a serious deficiency in counseling and that such deficiency is prejudicial); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F. 2d 
1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing the stance taken by district courts on “the issue of failure of counsel to 
inform an accused of the likely deportation consequences arising out of a guilty plea have all held that 
deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal proceeding and [failing] to advise does not amount 
to ineffective assistance of counsel”); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that failure to inform him of likelihood of deportation, as collateral consequence of guilty plea, 
did not constitute representation below objective standard of reasonableness); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 
941, 945 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the attorney’s failure to tell the defendant about the immigration 
consequence of entering a guilty plea did not amount to being ineffective), superseded by statute 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2008)), as 
recognized in, Sasonov v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 2d 626, 633 (D.N.J. 2008) (trial counsel’s failure to 
advise petitioner of immigration consequences of guilty plea did not amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that failure to advise defendant 
that drug conviction might lead to deportation did not constitute an ineffective assistance of counsel); 
United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7 (4th Cir. 1988)  (holding that the trial attorney’s failure to advise 
the defendant about the “collateral consequence of deportation mandated by his guilty plea” did not make 
him an ineffective attorney); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that “(1) 
Rule 11 did not require either defense counsel or court to advise alien defendant of potential deportation 
consequences of guilty plea; (2) failure to advise alien defendant of the deportation consequences did not 
require that defendant be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea; and (3) counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to inform defendant of deportation consequence.”); United States v. Blackwell, No. 3:04-cr-00040, 
2008 WL 4462000, at *9-11 (W.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2008) (stating that counsel was not unconstitutionally 
ineffective even if he or she failed to discuss the collateral implications of the conviction on defendant’s 
immigration status); United States v. Astorga, No. CR S-99-0270 WBS GGH, 2008 WL 2446119, at *6-7 
(E.D. Cal. June 12, 2008) (explaining that 9th Cir. case law places no affirmative duty on counsel to 
advise, but requires any advice to be properly rendered); Tacata v. United States, Civ. No. 07-00008 
SOM/LEK, 2007 WL 1303018, at *6 (D. Haw. May 2, 2007) (finding attorney’s failure to inform 
defendant of the immigration consequences was not ineffective); Chukwurah v. United States, 813 F. 
Supp. 161, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that defense counsel’s alleged failure to inform petitioner of 
possible immigration consequences of his plea is not sufficient basis for an ineffective assistance claim); 
Polanco v. United States, 803 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y 1992) (stating that assistance of counsel was not 
ineffective for failure to warn of possible deportation); Quin v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 454, 455 
(D.P.R. 1987) (determining that the defendant’s habeas corpus petition, which was based on the trial 
counsel’s failure to advise of deportation consequences, was disturbing and frivolous since defense 
counsel has no duty to advise as to immigration consequences), aff’d, 836 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating 
that failure to inform of deportation consequences was irrelevant because deportation is a collateral 
consequence); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Pamphile, 604 F. Supp. 753, 756-57 (D.V.I. 1985) (stating “[w]e 
believe that the attorney’s failure to inform Pamphile of the possibility of deportation does not cause 
Pamphile’s guilty plea to be involuntary”); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 252 (Alaska 1987) (holding that 
trial court has no responsibility to delve into immigration consequences and counsel’s failure to advise of 
immigration consequences does not constitute ineffective assistance); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245, 1247 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that defense counsel did not have duty to inform noncitizen defendants 
about potential collateral deportation proceedings and failure to provide such information did not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Major v. State, 814 So. 2d 424, 428 (Fla. 2002) (stating that 
defense counsel is under no obligation to advise defendant of collateral consequences of plea); People v. 
Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1991) (concluding that the failure to advise of potential immigration 
consequences did not fall below an “objective standard of reasonableness” as established by Strickland);  
Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005) (holding that defense counsel’s alleged 
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advise the client of immigration consequences under the Sixth Amendment.11  
Additionally, Indiana and Oregon have created an obligation to advise a defendant 
regarding immigration matters based upon provisions in its state constitution.12   
With that said, however, there are circumstances under which these courts 
will find an ineffective assistance violation under the Sixth Amendment or the state 
constitution.  The circumstances under which courts will uphold an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim can be broken up into three categories.13  First, some 
jurisdictions have held that the duty to advise rests upon whether or not the attorney 
knew or should have known that the client was a noncitizen.14  Second, other courts 
have found a distinction between nonadvice and misadvice.  These courts have held 
that while there is no duty to advise, if the attorney chooses to advise his or her 
client, and such advice is inaccurate, then the attorney may have violated the Sixth 
Amendment.15  Finally, a few jurisdictions recognize that criminal defense attorneys, 
 
failure to advise defendant of potential deportation consequences of his guilty plea was not cognizable as a 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106, 1110 (La. 2002) 
(holding that plea was neither rendered involuntary by counsel’s failure to advise of deportation 
consequences under collateral consequences doctrine nor was this ineffective assistance); State v. Zarate, 
651 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Neb. 2002) (holding that counsel’s failure to inform defendant of possibility of 
deportation does not render plea involuntary or unintelligent); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474, 476 (Nev. 
1999) (“The Supreme Court held that (1) failure of trial court to advise defendant of possible immigration 
consequences of guilty plea did not render plea involuntary, and (2) defense counsel’s failure to advise 
defendant of possible immigration consequences of guilty plea did not rise to level of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93-4 (Pa. 1989) (holding that 
defendant’s lack of knowledge of collateral consequences of guilty plea does not undermine validity of 
plea); Nikolaev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72, 77 (S.D. 2005) (holding that defense counsel has no duty to 
advise defendant of collateral consequence of deportation); State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating “[w]e follow the majority rule and hold that counsel’s performance is not 
deficient by the mere failure to apprise a noncitizen defendant that entry of a guilty plea might subject 
defendant to deportation”).   
11. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527 (Colo. 1987); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 
(N.M. 2004); State v. Creary, No. 82767, 2004 WL 351878, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb 26, 2004).  
12. Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. App. 1994); Gonzalez v. State, 134 P.3d 955, 
958-59 (Or. 2006). 
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.-C. and notes 14-16. 
14. See, e.g., Pozo, 746 P.2d at 529 (failing to investigate potential deportation consequences 
of guilty pleas constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if attorney had sufficient information to form 
reasonable belief that client was alien). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d. 1005, 1018 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding counsel’s 
performance as objectively unreasonable under contemporary standards of attorney competence where 
counsel effectively misled his client and not just failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of 
the criminal conviction); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 191 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. 
United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985); Riviere v. United States, No. 1:05-CV-0906, 2005 
WL 2614860 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2005); United States v. Shaw, No. CRIM.A. 99-525-01, Civ.A. 03-6759, 
2004 WL 1858336, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004); United States v. Corona-Maldonado, 46 F. Supp. 2d 
1171, 1173-74 (D. Kan. 1999); Alguno v. State, 892 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see also 
United States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (E.D. Va. 1995) (stating, but not deciding, that 
counsel’s affirmative misstatement of deportation consequences of plea may be ineffective assistance); 
Djioev v. State, No. A-9158, 2006 WL 361540, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006) (reversing and 
remanding decision back to trial court for further reconsideration in light of federal case law stating that 
affirmative misrepresentation of potential for deportation may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); 
People v. Soriano, 194 Cal. App. 3d. 1470, 1482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that counsel’s advice was 
ineffective when she only gave the defendant general advice concerning a guilty plea, rather than targeted 
advice concerning federal immigration proceedings – specifically concerning possible deportation); Rubio 
v. State, 194 P.3d 1224, 1232 n.47 (Nev. 2008) (holding “the reasoning of the Couto and Kwan courts 
persuasive with respect to the affirmative misrepresentation exception to the general rule regarding 
collateral consequences.  We now join those jurisdictions that have adopted or recognized the affirmative 
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at all times, have an affirmative duty to advise noncitizen clients of the immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction.16   
As the battle continues over where and how immigration law fits into the 
criminal courtroom, criminal defense attorneys are struggling with whether to extend 
immigration advice to their clients beyond what the courts have required.  Will 
criminal defense attorneys champion their clients’ interests or allow state and federal 
court decisions to guide their representation and, as a result, effectively deny 
noncitizen clients the assistance of legal counsel regarding the immigration 
consequences of their criminal conviction?  
The questions of whether criminal defense attorneys hold a duty to advise 
on such matters in the criminal courtroom is of growing importance amongst courts, 
advocates, and scholars.17  Scholars have addressed this issue within the scope of the 
 
misrepresentation exception to the collateral consequence rule and hold that affirmative misadvice 
regarding immigration consequences may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and support 
withdrawal of a guilty plea as involuntarily entered.”); State v. Garcia, 727 A.2d 97 (N.J. App. Div. 1999) 
(holding that a guilty plea may be vacated due to affirmative misadvice regarding immigration 
consequences but not due to failure to advise); Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 
WL 2249587, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 26, 2005) (holding that counsel’s affirmative misadvise is 
ineffective assistance of counsel); cf. Sasonov, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (determining that the trial counsel’s 
affirmative misrepresentation to the defendant was “objectively unreasonable”); United States v. Minhas, 
Nos. 4:94cr4046-WS, 4:06cv227-WS, 2008 WL 239079, at *11-13 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2008) (assuming 
that misadvising client about deportation consequences amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, but 
finding that defendant failed to meet prejudice prong of Strickland test); United States v. Khalaf, 116 F. 
Supp. 2d 210, 214-15 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that counsel’s erroneous advice that Judicial 
Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD) would protect petitioner from deportation, upon which 
petitioner substantially relied in deciding to plead guilty, constituted ineffective assistance); People v. 
Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 312 (Ill. 1985) (holding that defense counsel’s advice that defendant would not 
be deported was “erroneous and misleading and…not within the range of competence required of counsel 
in such situations,” rendering guilty plea invalid); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 935-37 (Utah 
2005) (accepting, on first impression, Downs-Morgan rule that affirmatively misadvising client amounts 
to ineffective assistance, but holding that counsel’s advice that conviction for sexual battery “might or 
might not” lead to deportation, was not an affirmative misrepresentation). 
16. Williams, 641 N.E.2d at 49 (finding that failure to inform a noncitizen defendant of the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction is ineffective assistance of counsel); Paredez, 101 
P.3d at 805 (holding that an attorney is obligated to both find out the immigration status of their client and 
provide specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty); Lyons v. Pearce, 694 P.2d 969, 977 (Or. 
1985) (holding that defense counsel is required to inform their noncitizen client that their conviction 
“may” result in deportation). 
17. Almost all federal circuits have held deportation to be a collateral consequence of pleading 
guilty, so that trial courts are not required to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences of his 
or her plea.  E.g., El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Amador-
Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 2002); Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27-28; United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 
344, 349 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); Campbell, 778 F.2d at 767; United States v. Russell, 
686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Ct. App); Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 464-66 (2d Cir. 1974); Cuthrell v. 
Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).  The remaining federal circuits that have not 
directly addressed the issue have signaled that they would reach the same holding if they received a case 
involving similar facts.  E.g., Broomes, 358 F.3d at 1251, 1257 n.4 (citing with approval cases from sister 
circuits holding that trial court is under no duty to inform defendants of immigration consequences of 
guilty pleas); Kandiel v. United States, 964 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that immigration 
consequences remain collateral to a criminal conviction and citing circuit cases with this holding with 
approval). 
 State courts have debated whether failure to advise on the part of the trial court (where 
mandated by statute) or by defense counsel requires a plea to be vacated under theories of involuntariness 
or ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990, 990 (Al. Crim. App. 
1990) (holding counsel’s failure to advise defendant of collateral consequences, such as deportation, is not 
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right to counsel under the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.18  This 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Tafoya, 500 P.2d at 247 (finding trial court has no responsibility to 
delve into immigration consequences and counsel’s failure to advise of immigration consequences does 
not constitute ineffective assistance); Rosas, 904 P.2d at 1245 (finding defense counsel did not have duty 
to inform noncitizen defendants about potential collateral deportation proceedings and failure to provide 
such information did not constitute ineffective assistance); In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1183 (Cal. 2001) 
(finding that the collateral consequence doctrine does not per se bar an ineffective claim for failure to 
advise as to the immigration consequences of a conviction); Slytman v. United States, 804 A.2d 1113, 
1118 (D.C. 2002) (holding trial court’s warning to noncitizen regarding immigration consequences, which 
omitted mention of exclusion and denial of naturalization, did not substantially comply with statute and 
defendant was permitted to withdraw plea); Daramy v. United States, 750 A.2d 552, 557 (D.C. 2000) 
(finding additional statements by judge beyond warning required by statute about potential impact of 
guilty plea on immigration were so misleading as to require reversal); State v. Sorino, 118 P.3d 645, 651 
(Haw. 2005) (requiring verbatim recitation of immigration consequences, as outlined in HAW. R. PENAL P. 
11(c)(5), before acceptance of defendant’s plea agreement); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 
1987) (concluding that the failure to advise defendant of even serious collateral consequences is not 
ineffective assistance; nevertheless, affirmative misadvice regarding the consequences of plea may render 
plea invalid); State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145, 1155 (Kan. 2002) (concluding that the trial court has no 
duty to advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea); Aldus v. State, 748 A.2d 463, 
468 (Me. 2000) (declining to determine if deportation falls under collateral consequences doctrine; 
however, blatant failure to answer client’s question constitutes ineffective assistance); Commonwealth v. 
Villalobos, 777 N.E.2d 116, 122 (Mass. 2002) (holding that judges are permitted, but not required, to 
expand on warnings of immigration consequences specified by statute); Garcia, 727 A.2d at 97 (holding 
that guilty plea may be vacated due to affirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences, but not 
due to failure to advise); People v. McDonald, 745 N.Y.S.2d 276, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), aff’d 802 
N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining that while failure of counsel to advise of potential immigration 
consequences is not ineffective assistance of counsel, affirmative misadvice may be sufficient to satisfy 
the prejudice prong under Strickland); State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 860 (N.D. 1994) (holding 
defendants need not be informed of all collateral consequences of guilty pleas and counsel has no duty to 
advise); Creary, 2004 WL 351878, at *1 (finding that the adoption of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2943.031 
(LEXISNEXIS 2008) does not relieve defendant’s lawyer of any duty to inform client of deportation 
consequences); State v. Collins, 626 P.2d 929, 930 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (failure to advise defendant that 
conviction could result in deportation is harmless error where defendant was represented by counsel, 
entered plea as result of plea agreement, did not raise issue at trial, or appears in record of case not to be a 
noncitizen); Machado v. State, 839 A.2d 509, 512-13 (R.I. 2003) (finding the court’s failure to inform 
defendant pursuant to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-12-22 (2008) entitles defendant to have plea vacated); 
Nikolaev, 705 N.W.2d at 72 (holding neither trial court nor defense counsel has a duty to advise defendant 
of collateral consequence of deportation in order for plea to be voluntary and informed); Harris v. State, 
887 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that defendant, counsel, and trial judge all 
substantially complied with statutory requirement that defendant be informed that deportation and loss of 
citizenship were possible consequences of guilty plea by completing waiver form created under TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon 1989) (effective Sept. 1, 2007)); State v. Littlefair, 51 
P.3d 116, 124 (Wash. 2002) (finding WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200 gives defendant statutory right to be 
advised of deportation consequences of plea).  
 See also Attila Bogdan, Guilty Pleas by Non-Citizens in Illinois: Immigration Consequences 
Reconsidered, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 19 (2003); John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of 
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Should this Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 
36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 691 (2003); Guy Cohen, Note, Weakness of the Collateral Consequences 
Doctrine: Counsel’s Duty to Inform Aliens of the Deportation Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 16 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1094 (1993); Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Different: Noncitizens and 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 89 CAL. L. REV. 741 (2001). 
18. For a discussion of the collateral consequences doctrine’s impact on the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, see Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 697 (2002) (arguing that the “‘collateral 
consequences’ rule is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.  Washington, which 
held that ineffective assistance of counsel consists of performance below a minimum standard of 
competence and resulting prejudice.”); John F. Fatino, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:  Identifying the 
Standards and Litigating the Issues, 49 S.D. L. REV. 31, 31 (2003) (discussing the standards in effective 
assistance of counsel claims); National Lawyers Guild, Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty – Ineffective 
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article advances that discussion by focusing on the tensions arising between the 
prevailing judicial interpretations of the Sixth Amendment and the ethical duties 
defense counsel owe to their clients.  I argue that: (1) attorneys, legislatures, and bar 
associations must recognize that a criminal attorney’s ethical and moral duty to his 
client already requires advising on the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction; and, (2) courts will recognize that advising a noncitizen defendant of the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction by defense counsel is a standard 
“norm” of practice under a Sixth Amendment analysis if advocates and their 
organizations recognize this duty under their ethical and moral obligations.  
Part I of this article examines the intersection between criminal and 
immigration law.  It shows the historical involvement of immigration law in the 
criminal court system as well as the increased influence the criminal justice system 
plays in the immigration system.  It demonstrates that immigration and criminal law 
have been historically intertwined and their effects on each other increasingly impact 
immigrants and their families.  Part II of the article discusses the problem caused by 
the courts’ and defense attorneys’ refusal to recognize a duty beyond what the Sixth 
Amendment requires when advising, or not advising, noncitizen clients of the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.  Part III of this article attempts 
to refocus the discussion by looking to the ethical rules that confer a duty on the 
attorney to advise on immigration matters.  This part discusses the increasing role 
that ethical rules are playing in assessing Sixth Amendment violations, thereby, 
solidifying the need for reinforcement of such standards in light of their increased 
use by courts – including the Supreme Court in recent cases such as Williams v. 
Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and Rompilla v. Beard19 – when assessing a Sixth 
Amendment violation under Strickland.   
In sum, I argue that regardless of the current Sixth Amendment holdings, an 
attorney’s ethical and moral duty is to advise his client about the immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction.  Once consensus is established on this basis, 
courts will be forced to recognize this as a prevailing “norm” and a larger growing 
recognition under the Sixth Amendment will follow.   
I.  INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL LAW 
One of the strongest and most successful arguments against creating a duty 
to advise noncitizen defendants about the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction is the “collateral consequences” doctrine.20  Under this doctrine, courts 
are obligated to inform a defendant of only the “direct” consequences of a plea, not 
any consequences that the court deems to be “indirect” or “collateral.”21  Direct 
 
Assistance of Counsel – State Courts, Immigr. Law & Crimes Database §4:9 (June 2010) (stating the 
differences between the collateral consequences doctrine and the right to effective counsel); Jamie Ostroff, 
Comment, In re Resendiz, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 367, 371 (2002) (explaining the court’s distinction in In re 
Resendiz between the collateral consequences doctrine and right to effective assistance of counsel).    
19. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
20. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 18 (discussing the collateral consequences doctrine’s 
impact on the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment); L. Griffin Tyndall, Note, “You Won’t Be 
Deported…Trust Me!” Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Duty to Advise Alien Defendants of the 
Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 653, 665 (1996) (discussing the 
collateral consequences doctrine in cases where aliens raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
21. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (holding that just because defendant did 
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consequences are defined as those that have a definite, immediate, and largely 
automatic effect on the defendant.22  The United States Supreme Court declared that 
the immigration consequence of deportation was not a form of criminal punishment, 
but rather a civil remedy aimed at excluding noncitizens from the country.23  
Therefore, the majority of lower federal and state courts have found that deportation 
is a collateral consequence and, therefore, attorneys are not obligated to advise on 
it.24   
Yet, problems with the above-mentioned determination arise.  First, the 
Supreme Court established the collateral consequences doctrine as an answer to the 
question of what duty the court has to criminal defendants.25  The Supreme Court has 
never applied this doctrine to Sixth Amendment violations.26  In fact, the analysis 
used in determining a Sixth Amendment violation has been the Strickland v. 
Washington two-prong test, not the collateral consequence doctrine.27  The Court has 
always rejected a bright line rule that eliminates case-by-case analysis under 
Strickland, such as that the collateral consequence doctrine creates, and has 
frequently reiterated its rejection of such a rule.28 
Next, even if the collateral consequences doctrine will be applied in certain 
circumstances, immigration consequences are not “indirect” to a criminal conviction 
and, therefore, should not fall under that category.  Although the majority of courts 
have found that immigration actions result from a separate proceeding in a separate 
court and held that criminal courts have no jurisdiction over such proceedings, strong 
arguments exist to contradict this long held belief.29  One argument is that 
immigration is not a separate and distinct matter, outside the jurisdiction of the 
criminal court system.30  Despite the refusal of most courts to recognize it, the 
existence of immigration law in the criminal court is well established as well as their 
intertwined histories and increasing ties.31  One perfect example of this relationship 
is the role that criminal court judges have played and continue to play in the removal 
 
not properly assess every factor relevant to his case is not reason enough to vacate plea, since defendant 
understood the direct consequences of his conviction).     
22. Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366. 
23. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A 
deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to 
punish.…”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 US. 698, 730 (1893) (“[An] order of deportation is not a 
punishment for a crime.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1650 (1992).  However, 
several courts throughout history have differed with the finding that immigration is not punishment.  For a 
more detailed analysis, see Stephen H. Legomsky, The Alien Criminal Defendant, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
105, 121-27 (1977); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana Conviction Can 
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454, 456-64 (1976). 
24. E.g., Banda, 1 F.3d at 356 (“The courts [addressing] the question… have uniformly held 
that deportation is [] collateral [to] the criminal process…We are not aware of any court [holding] the 
contrary.  Indeed, this conclusion squares with the Supreme Court’s observation that the accused must be 
‘fully aware of the direct consequences’ of a guilty plea.” (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 755).   
25.   Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. 
26.   In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d. at 1180-81. 
27.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
28. Chin & Holmes, supra note 18, at 711; Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000). 
29. E.g., Francis, supra note 17, at 710-11 (emphasis added) (noting the United States 
Supreme Court’s declaration that because deportation is handled in a civil proceeding, it is separate from 
criminal proceedings). 
30.   See discussion infra Part I.A.-B. 
31.   See infra notes 35 and 50 along with accompanying text. 
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of noncitizens.32  Additionally, when factors such as immigration status are used to 
influence the strategies of prosecutors in prosecuting cases, in negotiating pleas, in 
determining bail, and in influencing charges that will be imposed, the ties that bind 
immigration law and the criminal system are clearly illustrated.33  Another strong 
argument against their categorization as a collateral consequence is the “definite 
immediate, or largely automatic” effect criminal convictions, especially aggravated 
felony convictions, have on a noncitizen defendant in light of the dramatic changes 
to immigration law that have taken place in the last twenty years.34  As discussed 
below, immigration law in the criminal courtroom has almost always existed and 
continues to exist to this day.   
A.  History of Criminal Court Involvement with Immigration Law 
1.  Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation Abolished 
For seventy-three years, criminal courts had the ability to protect a 
defendant from removal.  Criminal court judges would sign a Judicial 
Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD) and neither the Attorney General nor 
Immigration Court had the power to overturn that decision to prevent the deportation 
of the immigrant.  This authority was conferred on the judges with the passage of the 
Immigration Act of 1917: 
That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of 
aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not 
apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation be 
made or directed if the court sentencing such alien for such crime 
shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence, makes 
a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall 
not be deported in pursuance of this act.35 
The rationale for the JRAD system was that the criminal court and its 
players had the best ability to assess whether the defendant should be removed based 
upon his criminal charges or conviction.36  Eligibility for JRAD hinged on the 
defendant’s ties to the community, as well as his family situation, criminal record, 
and evidence of rehabilitation.37  Because the criminal court judge spent more time 
on the criminal case and was more familiar with all of the circumstances of the case, 
 
32. Id.  
33. ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 22(A)(4) (imposing no bail for defendants accused of a “serious 
felony offense if defendant has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof is 
evident or the presumption great as to the present charge.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 802E-1 (1988) (stating 
that “the court in such cases shall grant the defendant a reasonable amount of time to negotiate with the 
prosecuting agency in the event the defendant or the defendant’s counsel was unaware of the possibility of 
deportation”); U.S. ATTY’S MAN. § 9-28.1000(A) (stating that “prosecutors may consider the collateral 
consequences” in determining “whether to charge” and “how to resolve” the case); NATIONAL DISTRICT 
ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (2d ed. 1991), Standard 43.6(1) (stating 
that “undue hardship to the accused” can be a basis not to charge or to offer or accept a particular plea).   
34. See McDermid, supra note 17, at 762; Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366 (4th Cir. 1973). 
35. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 
1251(b) (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 1227 (2006))). 
36. 53 CONG REC. 5171 (1916). 
37. For a description of the history of JRADs, see Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, 
The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1145 (2002). 
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the criminal court judge was seen as more knowledgeable about these factors than 
the immigration court judge.  Therefore, it was both logical and efficient for the 
criminal court judge to determine whether an immigrant should be relieved from 
deportation for a criminal conviction.   
The Congressional Record of the 1917 Immigration Act provides some 
insight into the legislative intent behind JRAD.38  During the debate, legislative 
representatives expressed their desire for criminal court judges to be provided with a 
real opportunity to determine whether the defendants before them should be 
deported.39  Congress’ goal was to help the defendant avoid deportation by educating 
judges on the possibility of providing the defendant with relief from deportation 
under JRAD, as permitted under the law at the time.40  Legislators also considered 
the length of time that a defendant could request a JRAD after sentencing.41  Their 
discussion spoke to the importance of JRADs and their struggle to make JRADs 
available to defendants is obviously in the record.42  The representatives’ main 
concern seemed to be the lack of existing knowledge and opportunity to seek a 
JRAD, never did the discussion discuss its abolishment.43  In this history, it is 
evident that Congress was aware of the detrimental effect that a criminal conviction 
had on a noncitizen’s life and wanted the noncitizen to be given the opportunity to 
stay in the country.  The argument that immigration law was a separate and distinct 
matter, therefore placing it outside the purview of the criminal court, was never 
brought into the discussion. 
As a further illustration of the keen awareness Congress held of the 
ramifications of criminal convictions on noncitizens and their support for its 
prevention, one only needs to be reminded of the fact that JRADs were proposed in 
1917, forty-three years before the right to counsel in state criminal cases was given 
to defendants.44 
It was not until 1990, 74 years after its enactment, that JRADs were 
abolished and the criminal courts lost the ability to prevent deportation of a 
noncitizen defendant who might otherwise have been worthy of reprieve.45  Very 
little is known about why JRADs were abolished, however the reason can be inferred 
from the political climate of the times.  By the late 1900s, “illegal” immigration was 
a top political issue.46  Scholars have pointed out that from the early 1990s to the 
 
38.    53 CONG REC. at 5169-72. 
39.    Id.  
40.  See, e.g., id. at 5170 (statement of Rep. Bennett) (“A judge sentencing a man for a felony 
may not know of the existence of this Federal Statute.  A man might come around in 48 hours afterwards 
and say, ‘This man that you have sentenced to two years in the penitentiary for felony will at the 
expiration of that time be deported’ and the judge will say, ‘That is too bad; that ought not to be.’”). 
41.  See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Sabbath) (“…that he will pronounce the sentence, and the 
moment he is through with it he can make his recommendation or at any time thereafter.”). 
42.  See, e.g., id. at 5171 (statement of Rep. Powers) (“…there is nothing in the amendment 
….which would require both the Commonwealth and the defendant to be represented at the time 
application was made to the judge for the purpose of securing his recommendation that the man should not 
be deported.”). 
43.   See id. at 5170-72. 
44. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of counsel in criminal cases is applicable to states via Fourteenth Amendment).  
45. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (codified 
in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 1227 (2006))). 
46. For a detailed analysis of the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes in America throughout the 
1990s, see Evelyn Crystal Lopez, Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Applied:  A Case Study of Chandler 
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present day, criminal and immigration investigations “increasingly are being used in 
mutually reinforcing ways… the government has relied on immigration enforcement 
tools as a pretext for investigative techniques and detentions that would be suspect 
under the criminal rules.”47  Therefore, due to the increased impact of criminal law 
on immigration law and anti-immigrant attitudes, criminal courts were stripped of 
their main tool for preventing deportation.48   
2.  Federal Criminal Courts’ Ability to Deport Noncitizens in 
Criminal Court Proceedings 
Although JRADs were abolished in 1990, criminal court judges were not 
severed from the determination of an immigrant defendant’s removal.  Reflecting the 
attitudes of the political climate, the perception that both legal and “illegal” 
immigrants were a drain on society and somehow served as a catalyst to increase the 
occurrence of crimes,49 Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Technical 
Corrections Act of 1994 (INTCA).  This act gave federal criminal court judges the 
power to order deportation during the sentencing phase of a federal criminal 
proceeding.50  Thereby, Congress gave criminal courts a continuing and direct 
involvement in deportation.  The purpose of INTCA was to establish procedures for 
expediting the deportation of criminal aliens, and it included provisions granting 
federal district courts authority to issue judicial orders of deportation at the time of 
sentencing.51  Federal criminal court judges continue to have this authority to order 
deportation of a noncitizen defendant during a criminal court proceeding, thereby 
bypassing immigration court and expediting the removal of the noncitizen defendant 
from the United States.52 
3.  Creation of Criminal Court Admonishments to Advise Defendants 
of the Immigration Consequences of Their Conviction at Time of Plea 
Under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and many states’ Rule of 
 
Arizona (May 23, 2004) (B.A. honors thesis, Stanford University), available at 
http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/pubpol/?q=system/files/shared/documents/Lopez.pdf. 
Lopez traces the proliferation of policies and the vast expansion of Immigration and Naturalization’s 
(INA) budget and range of enforcement.  Lopez notes that “[m]ost of the money, technology, and human 
resources went into operations targeting areas with high numbers of unauthorized crossings.” Id. at 2.  
Lopez continues to explain that “[t]hese government sanctioned operations include ‘Operation Hold the 
Line’ (September 1993) in Greater El Paso, Texas; ‘Operation Gatekeeper’ (October 1994), south San 
Diego, California, and ‘Operation Rio Grande’ (August 1997) in Brownsville, Texas.”  Id.   
47. See Taylor & Wright, supra note 37, at 1132. 
48. McDermid, supra note 17, at 759. 
49. Lopez, supra note 46, at 15-16.   
50. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 
§224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322-24 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252a (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 
1228(c) (1996))) [hereinafter INTCA] (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a United States 
district court shall have jurisdiction to enter a judicial order of deportation at the time of sentencing 
against an alien whose criminal conviction causes such alien to be deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A), 
if such an order has been requested by the United States Attorney with the concurrence of the 
Commissioner and if the court chooses to exercise such jurisdiction.”) 
51. H.R. Res. 783, 103d Cong. (1994) (legislative history of INTCA establishing procedures 
for expediting deportation of criminal aliens including provisions granting federal district courts authority 
to issue judicial orders of deportation at time of sentencing). 
52. See INTCA, supra note 50. 
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Criminal Procedure 11 or statutes, courts are required to admonish a defendant at the 
time of the plea to ensure that the plea is both knowing and voluntary.53  Historically, 
the Court has limited the scope of this admonishment to information to information 
determined to be a “direct consequence[]” of the plea.54  Therefore, immigration 
implications would not be included in the admonishment since they have been seen 
as “indirect” and, therefore, collateral consequences.55 
Despite, the Court’s distinction, many state legislatures have added 
provisions in their Rule 11 or enacted specific statutes requiring courts to admonish 
defendants that their plea may have adverse effects on their immigration status if 
they are not noncitizens.56  Two states, Colorado and Indiana, impose this duty by 
case law.57  In fact, many state-required admonishments go further and require the 
courts to advise that their plea may have adverse effects on, not only their 
immigration status, but their ability to naturalize.58  Currently, thirty states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the United States military require such 
admonishments.59  
Although legislative history is scant on the legislature’s intent when 
enacting such statutes, the state legislative histories that do exist reflect the 
overwhelming desire to inform noncitizen defendants of the potential immigration 
consequences of their criminal conviction so that defendants will be able to make an 
informed decision about their plea while they still have an opportunity to prevent 
deportation.  For example, the legislative history of the enactment of Washington’s 
admonishment provision reads as follows: 
The legislature finds and declares that in many instances involving 
an individual who is not a citizen of the United States charged with 
 
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (1970); see infra notes 56-57.  
54. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1957) (en banc)). 
55. E.g., Banda, 1 F.3d at 356.  
56. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016.5 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1j (2001); D.C. CODE § 
16-713 (2001); GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-7-93 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 802e-2 (1993); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/113-8 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 29D (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-210 (1997); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1819.02 (2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 220.50(7) (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 15a-1022 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2943.031 (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.385 (1997); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-12-22 (2000); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 6565(c) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200 (1990); WIS. STAT. § 971.08 (1993-94); ALASKA R. 
CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(C); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(F); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172 (2008); IDAHO CRIM. R. 11(d)(1) 
(2007); IOWA CT. R. CRIM. 2.8(2)(b)(3); ME. R. CRIM. P. 11 (H); MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-242(e); MA. R. CRIM. 
P. 12(c)(3)(C); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01, 15.02 (2008); N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-303(F)(5); P.R. RULES CRIM. 
P. 70; see also U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Colo., Local Rules § 3, App. K, available at 
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Documents/LocalRules/LR_App_K.pdf (form guilty plea notification 
requiring acknowledgement of possible deportation); Ky. Plea Form AOC-491, at 2 ¶ 10 (Ver. 1.01, Rev. 
2-03), available at http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/55E1F54E-ED5C-4A30-B1D5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/ 
491.pdf; NJ Jud. Plea Form, N.J. Dir. 14-08, at 3 ¶ 17 (promulgated pursuant to N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3-9), 
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ forms/10079_main_plea_form.pdf; PA. R. CRIM. P. 590 Plea 
Form, Question 30 (advice of deportation). 
57. Pozo, 746 P.2d. at 523; Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 2001). 
58. See, e.g., Slytman, 804 A.2d at 1116-17 (finding trial court’s warning to noncitizen 
regarding immigration consequences, which omitted mention of exclusion and denial of naturalization, did 
not substantially comply with statute and defendant was permitted to withdraw plea). 
59. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK FOR TRIAL OF 
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR: ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY PLEA, ch. 2, § II, 2-2-8 (2010); see also statutes 
cited supra note 56. 
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an offense punishable as a crime under state law, a plea of guilty is 
entered without the defendant knowing that a conviction of such 
offense is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of 
the United States.  Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature in 
enacting this section to promote fairness to such accused 
individuals by requiring in such cases that acceptance of a guilty 
plea be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special 
consequences for such a defendant which may result from the 
plea.60 
As illustrated by the language above, legislative intent reflects three issues:  (1) the 
legislature’s acknowledgement that criminal convictions have a severe impact on a 
noncitizen defendant’s immigration status; (2) their acknowledgment that defendants 
are often unaware of the consequences of their plea; and (3) their desire to create a 
mechanism by which noncitizen defendants will be informed of the immigration 
consequences of their criminal conviction during criminal court proceedings.  As is 
illustrated in the increasing number such enactments through the years, this issue is 
gaining an increasing amount of attention. Legislatures, along with advocates and 
policy makers, are aware that immigration consequences are not only critical to the 
noncitizen defendant but many times more important than the criminal sentence. 
These legislative additions reflect the growing movement to maneuver past 
the courts’ firmly established refusal to require advisement of immigration 
consequences during the criminal court proceeding, further reflecting the view that 
advice during the criminal proceeding is crucial.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
admonishment provisions continue to be enacted across the United States despite 
court opinions holding them to be collateral.   
B.  History of Criminal Convictions Affecting Immigration Status 
In addition to the historical and current presence of immigration law in the 
criminal court system, criminal law is playing an increasing role in the immigration 
court system in two ways: 1) the number of crimes that qualify as a removable 
offense has significantly increased; and 2) many forms of relief that were previously 
available have been abolished for noncitizens convicted of crimes.61  Unfortunately, 
these changes have done two things: (1) increased the number of noncitizens eligible 
for removal; and (2) increased the perception that immigrants are criminals, based on 
an increased pool of removable individuals.  Since criminal court proceedings may 
be the only chance to prevent removal, receiving information on the immigration 
consequences at the criminal court stage becomes crucial.62  
1.  Prior to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
Before the late 1980’s, immigration enforcement officials had broad 
 
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200(1) (1990). 
61. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471-72 (2007).  
62. See Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 382-83 (2006). 
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discretion to either deport or admit noncitizens convicted of crimes.63  The first 
federal statutes limiting immigration were enacted in 1875 and 1882, and prohibited 
the entry of any “convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself 
or herself without becoming a public charge.”64  At the time, the only criminals 
excluded were those who were found guilty of “felonious crimes other than political 
or growing out of or as the result of such political offenses or whose sentence has 
been remitted on condition of their emigration.”65  The Immigration Act of 1917 
provided for the removal of certain aliens from the United States, including those 
who had committed crimes “involving moral turpitude.”66  However, under this 
framework, relief was still available to those convicted of these crimes.  For 
example, the Attorney General, during this time, had discretion to issue a waiver of 
deportation under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.67  It is estimated 
that between 1989 and 1995, more than 10,000 noncitizen defendants received relief 
under this provision.68  Other forms of relief, such as JRADs, asylum, and 
suspension of deportation, were also available to noncitizens convicted of a crime.69 
2.  The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and Beyond 
In the late 1980’s, the climate towards immigrants began to change. This 
change was reflected in the various immigration acts enacted from 1988 to the 
present.  In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA).70  The ADAA 
was the first of a series of acts that seriously affected the immigration status of 
individuals convicted of crimes.  For example, the category of “aggravated felonies” 
was first seen in the ADAA.71  Under the ADAA, the definition of an “aggravated 
felony” included three crimes: murder, drug trafficking, and illegal trafficking in 
firearms or explosive devices.72  Although the ADAA created this new category, 
there was no limit to the discretionary relief available for those noncitizens convicted 
of such crimes.73  This change, however, was the beginning of the end. 
 
63. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294-96 (2001). 
64. Immigration Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (repealed 1974); Act of Mar. 
3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974).  
65. Act of Mar. 3, 1875 § 5. 
66. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 873, 875-76 (repealed 1996). 
67. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294-95. 
68. Id. at 295-96. 
                  69.  See Brian N. Hayes, Comment, Matter of A-A: The Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
Statutory Misinterpretation Denies Discretionary Relief to Aggravated Felons, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
247, 256-57 (summarizing the reduction in the availability of procedural relief with the enactment of the 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 
(1991)), including shortening the period during which an aggravated felon may petition a for review of a 
final deportation order thirty days, § 502(a); eliminating presidential or gubernatorial pardon of 
deportation for aggravated felons, § 506(a); presuming that any aggravated felon lacked “good moral 
character,” and was thus precluded from immigration benefits, such as voluntary departure, suspension of 
deportation, registry, and naturalization, § 509(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254(e)(1), 1259, 1427; eliminating the 
automatic stay of deportation pending judicial review for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, § 
513(a); and barring aggravated felons from applying for, or being granted, asylum, § 514(a)).  
70. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70  
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2008)). 
71. Id. 
72. Id.      
73. James F. Smith, United States Immigration Law as We Know It: El Clandestino, The 
American Gulag, Rounding up the Usual Suspects, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 747, 765 (2005).  
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In the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 (INA), Congress changed 
immigration law by rewriting the exclusion and deportation grounds and adopting a 
number of provisions directed at ensuring and expediting the removal of noncitizens 
with criminal convictions.74  The INA provisions eliminated JRADs, and added 
additional criminal offenses to the category of “aggravated felonies.”75  While 
increasing the number of offenses deemed to be aggravated felonies, the INA, at the 
same time, limited the forms of relief available to those convicted of those crimes, 
including a bar on the establishment of good moral character.76  As a result, those 
convicted of aggravated felonies became ineligible for gaining asylum, withholding 
or suspension of deportation, voluntary departure, registry, and naturalization.77  In 
1994, INTCA further broadened the category of aggravated felonies.  INTCA also 
gave federal criminal courts the power to order deportation at the sentencing stage, 
thus bypassing immigration courts and expediting removal.78 
In 1996, two years after the enactment of the INTCA, Congress passed the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA).79  
These acts further increased the number of crimes with removal consequences while 
limiting discretionary relief available to those convicted under them.80  The two acts 
increased the number of noncitizens who could be classified as aggravated felons, 
increased the number of crimes that made a person removable, severely restricted 
judicial review of administrative removal orders, limited remedies for relief from 
deportation, limited ability for admission into the United States by aggravated felons, 
and limited the discretionary relief from deportation available by the Attorney 
General.81  One specific example of AEDPA and IIRIRA’s effects was the repeal of 
INA § 212(c).  Prior to 1996, more than half of the applications under § 212(c) 
received relief from deportation.82  In the end, these acts further increased the 
number of noncitizens who were subject to removal and without remedy. 
In total, there are now twenty-one categories in the INA that enumerate 
crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies.83  The aggravated felony category, with its 
expansion, now includes: a “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or 
burglary offense… for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year;”84 “an 
offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to 
 
74. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2008)). 
75. Immigration Act of 1990 §§ 501, 505. 
76. Smith, supra note 73, at 772.  
77. Immigration Act of 1990 §§ 509, 515(a). 
78. INTCA, Pub. L. No. 103-416, §§ 222, 224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320, 4322 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1252(a) (2008)). 
79. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 304(b), 110 Stat 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)) [hereinafter 
IIRAIRA]; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 
Stat. 1214, 1276-77 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (2006)) [hereinafter AEDPA]; see Nancy 
Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed 
Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000). 
80. IIRAIRA § 304(b); AEDPA § 440(d) (expanding definitions).  
81. Id. 
82. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 296 n.5.  
83. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2009).  
84. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43)(G).  
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answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years’ 
imprisonment or more may be imposed;”85 and tax evasion charges “in which the 
revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.”86  Those convicted of aggravated 
felonies are currently presumed deportable upon conviction and can be ordered 
deported in federal criminal court proceedings.87  
C.  Immigration Consequences and Its Impact 
As evidenced above, removal from the United States based on criminal 
convictions has vastly increased over the last twenty years and has increased most 
drastically over the last seven to ten years.88  This increase has had devastating 
results, as illustrated by the following statistical evidence.  In 1986, the United States 
removed 1,978 noncitizens based on their criminal convictions.89  During that same 
year, the total number of individuals removed from the United States was 24,592.90  
This number includes all individuals removed from the United States that year, 
regardless of the reason for removal.  In stark contrast, in 2007 alone, the 
Department of Homeland Security removed 99,900 criminal noncitizens from the 
United States.91  The total number of persons removed in 2007 was over 319,000.92  
Between 1996 and 2007, it is estimated that more than 670,000 noncitizens were 
removed from the United States based on criminal convictions.93 
These statistics show the devastating effects of the AEDPA and IIRAIRA 
on noncitizens.  Unfortunately, when taking a closer look, the statistics also reflect 
effects on populations that are already particularly vulnerable.  For example, the 
majority of defendants being removed are from four Latin American countries: 
Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.94  In fact, in fiscal year 2007 
(through June 18, 2007), these four countries accounted for approximately eighty-
 
85. Id. § 101(a)(43)(T). 
86. Id. § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii).  
87.   AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 442(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1280 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252a (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 1228(c) (1996))) (“An alien convicted of [any] aggravated felony 
shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States.”). 
88. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGR. STATISTICS 97-105, tbl. 
38 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ 
ois_yb_2009.pdf. 
89. MARY DOUGHERTY, DENISE WILSON & AMY WU, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
OFFICE OF IMMIGR STATISTICS, ANN. REP.: IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2004 6, tbl. 4 (2005), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/Enforcement _AR_05.pdf. 
90. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF IMMIGR. STATISTICS 2005 (2006), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005 _Yearbook.pdf. 
91. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT 4, tbl. 4 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ 
enforcement_ar_07.pdf.   
92. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGR. STATISTICS: 2007, ALIENS REMOVED OR RETURNED: FISCAL YEARS 1892-2007 (2007), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk07En.shtm (follow “Table 36” 
hyperlink).  
93. House Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Deportees to Latin American and Caribbean 
Countries, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1802 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Deportees] (citing 
Representative Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, at a July 24, 2007 hearing). 
94. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 91. 
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eight percent of the total number of removals.95  Over 80% of prosecuted individuals 
are poor.96  Of the prosecuted defendants, over 90% plead guilty.97  
The immigration changes have also had devastating effects on the families 
left behind in the United States by deported noncitizens.  For example, because of 
the enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA, it is estimated that 1.6 million families in the 
United States have been separated.98  It is estimated that nearly 10% of families with 
children in the United States live in a “mixed status” household.99  Mixed status is 
defined as a family that has both citizen and noncitizen members.100  As a result of 
these mixed status families, the change in immigration laws has dramatically 
affected the families’ ability to stay together and left them considerably more 
vulnerable to separation.    
For those who are not persuaded that the large number of noncitizens who 
are being deported is a reason to be concerned, the high cost of federal detention 
based on immigration violations alone may provide a different perspective.  The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that from 1995 to 2003, the number of individuals 
in federal prison for immigration violations grew 394% from 3,420 individuals to 
16,903.101  In 2008, Federal prisoners serving a sentence for immigration offenses 
comprised 10.6% of the total inmate population, or 21,359 of the 201,498 individuals 
in federal prison.102  As of 2009, immigration crimes represented the single largest 
group of all federal prosecutions, totaling fifty-four percent.103  The cost to imprison 
one state inmate is approximately $22,650, while it costs $22,632 per federal inmate 
per year.104  Therefore, the amount of money spent on the detention of individuals for 
immigration violations alone has increased from approximately $77 million in 1995 
to $483 million per year in 2008. 
The immigration consequences of criminal convictions affect a defendant’s 
immigration status, along with his or her ability to naturalize, to remain out of prison 
on bond while a criminal trial or hearing is pending, to negotiate a plea, and to 
remain with family, friends, and other loved ones. Theses consequences also impact 
millions of noncitizens, families, friends, communities, as well as the country’s 
social and economic structure.  The devastating impact that criminal convictions 
have on noncitizen defendants, their families, and society shows that giving advice 
 
95. Hearing on Deportees, supra note 93. 
96. STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE (1996), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/id.pdf.  
97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008). More 
specifically, the Sentencing Commission stated that “[n]early ninety percent of all federal criminal cases 
involve guilty pleas and many of these cases involve some sort of plea agreement.” Id.  (emphasis added). 
98. Id. 
99. Fix & Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 1. 
100. Id.  
101. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Immigration Law and Long-Term Residents: A Missing 
Chapter in American Criminal Law (Revised), 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 645, 660 (2008). 
102.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2008, 61 
(2008), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/sob08.pdf. 
103. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), FY 2009 Federal 
Prosecutions, available at http://trac.edu/tracreports/crim/223/.   
104. JAMES J. STEPHAN, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NO. 
NCJ 202949, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf (The average annual operating cost per state inmate in 2001 was $22,650.  The 
average operating cost by the Federal Bureau of Prisons was $22,632 per inmate). 
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concerning these consequences during the criminal proceeding is immeasurable.    
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS ATTORNEYS AGAINST 
RECRIMINATION FOR THEIR FAILURE TO FULFILL ETHICAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
“[A] lawyer can never be guided solely by thoughts of profit, self-advancement or 
self-interest, because the first duty of his profession is to serve others.  And the 
public he serves does not know the answers to the questions they ask, the correctness 
of the decisions he makes, or the wisdom of the advice he gives them.  They are 
dependent upon the lawyer’s judgment and integrity.  Because of this dependence, 
which is becoming greater as our society becomes more complicated, the lawyer’s 
duty must always be to place his clients’ needs above his own.” 105 
A.  Sixth Amendment Fails to Enforce an Attorney’s Duties 
The United States Constitution establishes a court system giving 
individuals, among other things, the right to counsel in criminal trials.106  The 
Supreme Court, through its decisions, has recognized that the assistance of counsel 
“is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to [e]nsure 
fundamental human rights of life and liberty.”107  In Gideon v. Wainwright, the 
Supreme Court stated plainly that “[t]he right of one charged with [a] crime to 
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
countries, but it is in ours.”108 Because 90% of criminal cases are resolved with 
pleas, and such pleas are negotiated with prosecutors, this principle applies equally 
to the appointment of counsel to ensure that defendants receive a fair plea.109   
While the Sixth Amendment right to counsel started out as one of the most 
important safeguards, it has proven to present one of the most disappointing and 
disturbingly low standards in our justice system.110  Courts have not found counsel 
ineffective under the Sixth Amendment even when they have been drunk, asleep, or 
absent during trial.111  As one scholar has pointed out, the standard of effective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment “is not an end that defense 
 
105. A. Stevens Halsted, Jr., Call it Professional Responsibility, 43 CAL. ST. B. J. 110, 110 
(1968) (emphasis added). 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.   
107. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (holding that compliance with Sixth 
Amendment’s mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to federal court’s authority to deprive 
accused of his life or liberty); see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936) 
(“[C]ertain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against federal action, were 
also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.”).  
108. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
109. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (stating that since Gideon, the 
defendant pleading guilty has federal right to assistance of counsel); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, supra note 97, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008). 
110. Paul Kelly, Are We Prepared to Offer Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. 
L. J. 1089, 1093 (2001).   
111. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 652 (2006).  
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attorneys should strive to reach, but rather a marker of zealous representation.”112  It 
is a marker that attorneys should strive above. 
All courts must use the test first laid out in Strickland v. Washington in 
deciding whether defense counsel has violated the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Under Strickland, the defendant must prove: (1) that counsel’s performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the deficiency in 
counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant.113  In Hill v. Lockhart, the Supreme 
Court expanded the Strickland test when assessing ineffective assistance of counsel 
in guilty pleas.114  In guilty pleas, defendants must satisfy the first prong of 
Strickland, in the same manner as claims after trial, by showing that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.115  However, when 
pleading guilty, to satisfy the second “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test, 
defendants must prove that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the defendant would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.116   
When trying to decide whether or not an attorney has violated the first 
prong of the Strickland standard, many courts rely on what a “competent” attorney 
would do.117  In Strickland, the Court stated that courts should look at the 
“[p]revailing norms of practice” as one guide to judging the effectiveness of counsel 
and thereby determine whether counsel was competent to satisfy the first prong of 
the test.118  In Strickland, however, the Supreme Court refused to give specific 
guidelines or requirements.  In fact, the Court stated that “[prevailing norms of 
practice as reflected in the American Bar Association…are guides to determining 
what is reasonable, but they are only guides.”119  Therefore, although competency 
can be determined by looking at such things as American Bar Association (ABA) 
Standards, treatises, and other practitioner resources, it is not an absolute in 
determining a Sixth Amendment violation.120  The Court stated that “the purpose of 
effective assistance of counsel was not to improve the quality of legal representation 
but simply to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.”121   
Regarding issues that the courts have found to be collateral matters, such as 
immigration, the analysis has been even more disturbing.  Although the Supreme 
Court has never ruled on whether the incorporation of the collateral consequences 
doctrine into the analysis of the Sixth Amendment is proper, lower federal and state 
courts have done so.  Historically, state and lower federal courts have found that 
defense counsel cannot violate the first prong of Strickland and fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness when courts have determined that the matter is 
collateral.122  Therefore, counsel is under no obligation to advise defendants about 
 
112. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral 
Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1082 (2004).   
113. Strickland  v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
114. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
115. Id. at 57. 
116. Id. at 59. 
117. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
118. Id. at 687-88. 
119. Id. at 688. 
 120. Id. at 689. 
121. Id.  
122. E.g., Fry, 322 F.3d at 1200-1201; Banda, 1 F.3d at 356; Del Rosario, 902 F.2d at 59; 
Kolb, 880 F.2d at 944-945; Campbell, 778 F.2d at 768; State v. Denisyuk, 991 A.2d 1275, 1305 (Md. Ct. 
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immigration consequences in criminal court proceedings. This holding creates a per 
se rule, which the Court’s ruling in Strickland specifically rejected.123  In spite of 
this, courts consistently use the collateral consequences doctrine as a rule of 
exclusion from a Sixth Amendment violation. 
The majority of lower federal and state courts have strongly held onto this 
per se rule.  However, some courts have veered away from this long held belief and 
found ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment when addressing 
the advisement of immigration consequences.124  In fact, a few courts have rejected 
the use of the collateral consequences doctrine when assessing a Sixth Amendment 
violation, giving noncitizens and their advocates a glimmer of hope to future case 
holdings.125  These courts have structured potential Sixth Amendment violations into 
three categories: (1) an attorney who misadvises the client may be held to be 
ineffective; (2) a defense attorney who “knew or should have known” that his or her 
client was not a United States citizen and fails to advise the defendant may result in a 
Sixth Amendment violation; and (3) an attorney has an affirmative duty to advise as 
to the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction and failure to do so can be 
found to be ineffective.126  
While the first two categories allow an attorney’s failure to advise on the 
immigration consequences to make it passed the first prong of Strickland, they are 
problematic.  As you will see, these holdings give criminal defense attorneys a 
license to remain silent or ignorant concerning issues that their clients may deem 
more important than the criminal punishment that is imposed; therefore, his client is 
left without adequate advice, contrary to the attorney’s ethical duty to his client, the 
criminal justice system, and society. 
  
B. Misadvice versus Nonadvice Creates a “Don’t Tell” Policy 
 
Although the majority of courts continue to hold that there is no duty to 
advise, many of these courts have recognized a difference between giving no advice 
and giving misadvice.127  While these courts hold firm to the belief that there is no 
duty to advise as to immigration consequences, many of these courts also hold that if 
an attorney chooses to advise and misadvises, he may be found to be ineffective 
under the Sixth Amendment.128   
 
Spec. App. 2010), cert. granted, 997 A.2d 789 (Md. June 9, 2010); People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 269 
(N.Y. 1995). Contra In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d at 1179-83 (concluding that the “collateral nature of 
immigration consequences does not foreclose petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim”). 
123. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. 
124. Couto, 311 F.3d at 187-88; Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1538-41; Williams, 641 N.E.2d 
at 49; Lyons, 694 P.2d at 977; Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 934. See generally Rob A. Justman, The Effects 
of AEDPA and IIRIRA on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants 
of Deportation Consequences of Pleading Guilty on an “Aggravated Felony,” 2004 UTAH L. REV. 701 
(2004) (providing a discussion that includes the progression of how courts sided on the collateral 
consequences doctrine before and after the AEDPA and IIRIRA were passed). 
125. See cases cited supra note 14-16. 
126. Id. 
127. E.g., Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 63-65 (4th Cir. 1979); see also cases cited supra 
note 15. 
128. E.g., United States v. DeFreitas, 865 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Quin, 
836 F.2d 654, 655 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. 
Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960, 962 (Fla. 1987); Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 579 (Minn. 1998); People v. 
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Currently, there is an 18-2 split as to whether misadvice violates the Sixth 
Amendment.  The majority of jurisdictions hold that misadvice violates the Sixth 
Amendment while the minority hold that since immigration consequences are 
collateral, even misadvice on such matters can never violate the Sixth 
Amendment.129  In the former, misadvice has been able to take the analysis beyond 
the first prong of Strickland.  These courts have found that affirmative misadvice 
fails the first prong of the Strickland test because it falls below the objective standard 
of reasonableness of what a competent attorney would do.130  Courts refuse to 
support the attorney’s conduct of failing to properly advise a client on an issue 
deemed critical for deciding whether to plead guilty, regardless of the fact that the 
information is defined as collateral.  To the courts, the plea cannot be voluntary or 
knowing when the information that helped to decide the plea was not correct.  
Currently, this holding creates the only “loophole” through the strict categorical 
exclusion from a full Sixth Amendment analysis based on the collateral 
consequences doctrine in these jurisdictions.   
To the convicted noncitizen, the misadvice holding may be the only saving 
grace in these jurisdictions.  Many advocates argue that this is a step in the right 
direction and that noncitizens should be allowed to withdraw their plea if they were 
misinformed.  The client, who was misadvised and who attempted to withdraw his 
plea to prevent his removal from the United States, is undoubtedly grateful for the 
misadvice holding.  However, it is hard to determine the true benefit of this holding 
to the system and the attorney-client relationship.  
Although the client who was misadvised can successfully withdraw his 
plea, the defendant who comes after him will unlikely have the benefit of any advice 
at all.  Some contend that would not be the case – that the attorney would educate 
himself.  They suggest that counsel would take one of the many continuing legal 
education classes available on the subject or read one of the many books or practice 
guides131 so that counsel’s next noncitizen client would receive the requisite advice 
and information.  Unfortunately, this is not the usual outcome.132 Criminal defense 
attorneys have learned to say nothing.  These jurisdictions, through their holding, 
inadvertently support a “Don’t Tell” policy.  Courts hold that the attorney who gives 
no advice cannot be found to be ineffective, but the attorney who chooses to give 
 
Dor, 505 N.Y.S.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
129. Compare Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1016-18 (finding counsel’s performance as objectively 
unreasonable under contemporary standards of attorney competence where counsel effectively misled his 
client and not just failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of the criminal conviction) with 
United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (refusing to allow withdrawal of defendant’s 
guilty plea notwithstanding blatant misadvice concerning the possibility of deportation, concluding that 
the defendant need only be fully aware of the direct consequences and misadvise on collateral 
consequences as a matter of law cannot invalidate a guilty plea). 
130. See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
131. E.g., Tova Indritz, Puzzling Consequences of Criminal Immigration Cases, CHAMPION, 
Feb. 26, 2002, at 12, 20, 26; William R. Maynard, Deportation: An Immigration Law Primer for the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer, CHAMPION, June 23, 1999, at 12; Ronald Kaplovitz, Criminal Immigration: 
The Consequences of Criminal Convictions on Non-U.S. Citizens, 82 MICH. B.J. 30, 30 (Feb. 2003); David 
C. Koelsch, Proceed with Caution: Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 87 MICH. B.J. 44, 
44 (Nov. 2008); Fernando A. Nuñez, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions to Noncitizens, 
41MD. B.J. 40, 40 (Aug. 2008); Rex B. Wingerter, Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 37 MD. B.J. 21, 
21 (Apr. 2004). 
132. This writer has systematically received refusals by criminal attorneys to be trained on the 
issue of immigration consequences based upon the misadvice versus nonadvice holdings. 
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advice can be found to be ineffective according to the Sixth Amendment.  Courts 
place a heavier burden on the attorney who gives advice, stating that while silence is 
supported, advisement is at the attorney’s own risk.  Courts, in refusing to allow the 
lack of advice to violate the Sixth Amendment, create an incentive for the attorney to 
remain silent on information that his client may deem more important than the 
criminal punishment itself.133 
The rationale of the misadvice holding is based on the premise that once 
information is received, it must be accurate if the defendant relied upon that 
information when pleading guilty.  However, if this information is crucial to the 
decision making of the client, should not it be both given and accurate?  Contrary to 
popular norm, ignorance is not always bliss.  Whether a noncitizen defendant knows 
the fact that immigration consequences exist and is misinformed or is ignorant of the 
fact that immigration consequences do exist and was not told, it cannot be deemed 
any less detrimental.134  In both scenarios, the noncitizen defendant was not fully 
aware of the information necessary to decide whether to plead guilty.135    
An additional problem with the misadvice holding is its definition.  The 
term “misadvice” seems to be defined differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
So far, there seem to be two categories defining misadvice.  The first can be defined 
as any information received that is clearly erroneous.  For example, the attorney 
states that a plea will not affect the client’s immigration status, but it does.136  The 
second category, however, has not been as easy for the courts to determine.  It is best 
exemplified in a case where the attorney says that the criminal conviction “may” or 
“could” affect the defendant’s immigration status.137  Jurisdictions are split in their 
conclusions of whether the latter example is misadvice or not.138  Some courts have 
found that the word “may” is sufficient for the attorney to cover any obligation owed 
to the client.139  Other jurisdictions, however, have found that due to the “automatic” 
nature of the deportation based on the conviction, it is misadvice to tell a client the 
plea “may” or “could” affect his immigration status.140  This opinion seems to 
 
133. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation “may result in 
loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living.”); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 
6, 10 (1922) (stating that “deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or 
exile”); Correa, 485 N.E.2d at 311 (stating that “in most cases this collateral consequence is more severe 
than the penalty imposed by the court in response to the plea.”). 
134.  See Paredez, 101 P.3d at 804-06 (finding that whether counsel gives no advise or only 
general advise, the defendant does not receive sufficient information to plead guilty). 
135.   Id. 
136. See, e.g., Couto, 311 F.3d at 187 (holding that counsel was ineffective by advising the 
defendant that “there were things that could be done to avoid deportation (when in fact there were none).”; 
State v. Nunez-Valdez, 975 A.2d 418, 425-26 (N.J. 2009) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel 
advised the defendant that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea of guilty to a charge 
deemed an aggravated felony under immigration law). 
137. See infra note 143 
138. Compare Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 938 (attorney giving defendant advice that sexual 
battery “might or might not” lead to his deportation is not affirmative misrepresentation), with Soriano, 
194 Cal. App. at 1482 (holding that counsel was ineffective when she informed defendant that the plea 
“might” have deportation consequences).   
139. E.g., Gonzalez, 134 P.3d at 958 (stating that counsel is not required to specify the 
likelihood that deportation will take place but is only required to make the defendant aware that 
deportation could result from the conviction) . 
140. E.g., Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805 (holding that counsel has an affirmative duty to determine 
client’s immigration status and provide him with specific advice regarding the impact a guilty plea would 
have on his immigration status). 
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increasingly be held when there is virtually no doubt that removal is eminent, such as 
when a lawful permanent resident is convicted of an aggravated felony.141   
Under the misadvice holding, an attorney cannot be confident that he will 
not be brought up on a Sixth Amendment violation unless he remains completely 
silent on the issue.  Courts are not clear on the line that must be crossed for any 
communication or advice that is given to the noncitizen defendant regarding 
immigration consequences.  Attorneys who respond to specific questions, purport to 
have experience and knowledge on the issue of immigration consequences, or 
respond in a way that the court deems to be ambiguous, vague, or incorrect, may be 
held to have violated the Sixth Amendment.142   
All the above issues are detrimental to the attorney-client relationship, the 
criminal court system and society.  Distinguishing between misadvice and nonadvice 
naturally “creates a chilling effect on the attorney’s decision to offer any advice.”143  
The misadvice holding acknowledges the impossibility of a noncitizen defendant, 
who has been incorrectly advised, to make an intelligent decision from alternative 
courses of action.  However, the underlying premise that allows for the refusal to 
give advice on the same information without violation, knowing the information to 
have the same importance, pits the attorney’s duties with that of the desire to escape 
the possibility of a Sixth Amendment violation. Under this holding, the Sixth 
Amendment fails to reinforce the attorney-client relationship since it allows 
attorneys the opportunity and protection under the Sixth Amendment to say nothing 
to his client, leaving their clients ignorant to the ramification the conviction will have 
on his immigration status and life and, if given a general advisement, left to 
determine the complex legal issue alone.144    
C.  “Knew or Should Have Known” Creates a “Don’t Ask” Policy 
Another category that has been able to overcome the per se exclusion from 
a full Strickland analysis is based upon whether the defense attorney “knew or 
should have known” that the client was a noncitizen.145  Unfortunately, this holding 
can be seen as the true meaning of the phrase, “ignorance is bliss,” by allowing an 
attorney to escape a Sixth Amendment violation by knowingly failing to investigate 
both the client’s immigration status and the client’s objectives for the outcome of the 
case.   
 
141. E.g., Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 970 (concluding that an attorney giving defendant 
advice that sexual battery “might or might not” lead to his deportation is affirmative misrepresentation). 
142. E.g., State v. Carlos, 147 P.3d 897, 902 (N.M. 2006) (holding that counsel is required to 
advise the defendant on the specific immigration consequences he will face as a result of his conviction 
and that providing only general advise of the “possibilities” is ineffective); Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1017; 
Couto, 311 F.3d at 187-88; Correa, 485 N.E.2d at 311-12. 
143. Francis, supra note 17, at 726. 
144. See Del Rosario, 902 F.2d at 61 (Mikva, J., concurring) (stating that the “possibility of 
being deported can be-and frequently is-the most important factor in a criminal defendant’s decision how 
to plead.”); Chin & Holmes, supra note 18, at 726 (stating that nonadvice places an affirmative duty to 
discern complex legal issues on a class of clients least able to handle that duty).   
145. E.g., Pozo, 746 P.2d at 527 (holding that determination of whether failure to investigate 
collateral consequences constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel “turns to a significant degree upon 
whether the attorney had sufficient information to form a reasonable belief that the client was in fact an 
alien.”); Daley v. Maryland, 487 A.2d 320, 322-23 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) (finding “the factual predicate 
necessary to succeed on this claim-namely, that his lawyer knew or should have known that he was an 
alien-is absent.”) 
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Under this ruling, the duty arises as soon as an attorney has knowledge that 
the client is not a United States citizen.  However, there is no imposed duty on the 
attorney to ask about a client’s immigration status.  Therefore, if an attorney does not 
ask specifically or investigate into the possible goals or objectives of the client, the 
analysis when proving the attorney “knew or should have known” that the client was 
not a United States citizen becomes complicated.  Complicated, because the facts 
which would indicate that the attorney “knew or should have known” that the client 
was not a citizen relies on subjective assumptions of alienage and citizenship.  
Obviously, factors such as information that a client has an immigration hold, 
prosecutor statements that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) wants to 
talk to the client, or the police report for identity theft states the arrests were part of 
an ICE worksite raid targeted against undocumented workers would arguably give 
way to objective facts that can reasonably put an attorney on notice to further 
investigate immigration status.  However, absent these objective facts, what 
information could determine knowledge of immigration status?  The answer raises 
one of the most problematic issues: under this analysis, attorneys and courts are left 
to determine a Sixth Amendment violation based upon subjective assumptions of 
alienage.  Racial and ethnic stereotypes would be required as part of the process of 
determining the duty to advise under this analysis. The defendant must be construed 
as a foreigner, an “other,” or an “illegal” immigrant. 
Society’s perceptions conclude that American citizenship status exists if one 
is White and English-speaking.146  American citizenship is also assumed to be held 
by Blacks, although they may not receive the full benefits of citizenship.147  Our 
society considers Asians and Latinos as foreigners.148  Latin-American, Asian-
American, and Arab-American citizens find themselves stigmatized and treated as 
perpetual foreigners.149 In fact, most Latinos are seen as “illegal” and Mexican, 
lumped together as one group, regardless of whether they are from Puerto Rico, 
 
146. See JILL NORGREN &  SERENA NANDA, AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURALISM AND LAW 65 
(Praeger Publishers 2006) (discussing pressure to conform to “mainstream version of American culture, 
including, perhaps most importantly by speaking English”) [hereinafter NORGREN & NANDA]; Heidi 
Tarver, Language and Politics in the 1980s: The Story of U.S. English, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT:  
CONTENDING VIEWS ON PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 206-18 (1995); Juan F. 
Perea, Essay, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 972-81 (1995) 
(discussing the historical desire for America to be an English-speaking Anglo society). 
147. Victor Romero, Race, Immigration, and the Department of Homeland Security, 19 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 51, 54 (2004-2005) (“Generally, there is a presumption that United States 
citizens are either white or black—either Caucasians or African Americans—where presumptive 
noncitizens are Latina\os or Asians.”); see generally PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE 
ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION DISASTER 58-73 (1995) (discussing white America as caught between 
the “pincers” of Hispanic and Asian immigration); WHO BELONGS IN AMERICA: PRESIDENTS, RHETORIC 
AND IMMIGRATION (Vanessa B. Beasley ed., Texas A&M University Press 2006). 
148. Id.; Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 101, 117-29 (1997) (discussing the classification of Latinos as “foreigners”).    
149. See Juan Perea, Introduction for IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-
IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 2 (Juan F. Perea ed., New York University Press 1997) 
(“When citizens and aliens look alike, then all are presumed to be alien and foreign and undermining of 
the national character.  This is an old theme in American politics.”); Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and 
the Search for Political Community Among “We the People,” 76 OR. L. REV. 233, 252-53 (1997) 
(discussing the recurring belief that White is “American” and Mexican, Asian and Arab Americans are 
considered “foreign”); George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and 
Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 321, 345 (1997). 
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Central or South America.150  Spanish is considered “un-American” and the language 
of the “illegal alien,” despite the fact that millions of United States citizens speak 
Spanish.151   
If defendants are Caucasian and speak without an accent, does an attorney 
get an opportunity to show that he or she could not have known about the 
defendant’s alienage status?  If the defendant is Latino, does an attorney 
automatically assume that he or she is not a United States citizen?  Does it matter if 
the Latino defendant speaks with an accent?  This type of analysis opens the door for 
inconsistent enforcement of the Sixth Amendment that relies upon stereotypes, 
assumptions, and discriminatory perceptions based upon who we deem to belong in 
our society and who we deem to not belong to the highest class of individuals in this 
country – citizens. 
Given this underlying reasoning, courts have been astute in their refusal to 
find a violation using any of the assumptions or stereotypes of alienage and reluctant 
to find any characteristic as a way to determine whether the attorney “knew or 
should have known.”  For example, in Daley v. Maryland, the Maryland Appellate 
Court held that the mere fact that the defendant spoke English with a foreign accent 
was not enough for the attorney to have known that the defendant was not a United 
States citizen.152  In Proulx v. State, the Florida District Court of Appeals seemed to 
concur with the Daley court, finding that the attorney’s knowledge that the client was 
born in Canada, not the United States, was not enough to show that the attorney 
“knew or should have known” that the defendant was not a United States citizen nor 
enough to require for further inquiry of the defendant regarding his status.153  
Simultaneously, while refusing to use factors that society uses to assess 
alienage as a means to show an attorney “knew or should have known” that the 
defendant was not a citizen, courts have used factors that reinforce stereotypes of 
citizenship such as the ability to speak English.  For example, the assumption that 
citizens speak English was used as an important factor in determining that the 
attorney in Daley lacked sufficient knowledge to be held ineffective.154  In reaching 
the aforementioned holding, the court mentioned that the defendant spoke “fluent 
English with a Caribbean accent.”155  The Maryland court, however, did not explain 
the rationale behind its holding.  We can only speculate that the court agreed that 
English fluency is a sign of citizenship, which is consistent with society’s opinion of 
belonging.156  Yet, the defendant in Daley spoke with a Caribbean accent.  While 
 
150. Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?  Assimilation and the Mexican-
American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1290 (“Although many consider Latinos to be a monolithic 
group…”); see David Montgomery, One Label Does Not Fit All, THE WASHINGTON POST, September 11, 
2008, at C1. 
151. G. Gordon Liddy on Sotomayor, The G. Gordon Liddy Show (May 29, 2009) (while 
discussing Justice Sotomayor, who is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, a United States citizen, he 
stated that “raza in ‘illegal alien’ meant race”); see generally NORGREN & NANDA, supra note 146 at 65 
(discussing speaking a foreign language as a sign of “national disloyalty” and “inadequate assimilation”); 
Raymond Tatalovich, Official English as Nativist Backlash, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM 
AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 78-102 (Juan F. Perea ed., New York 
University Press 1997). 
152. Daley, 487 A.2d at 323. 
153. Proulx v. State, 422 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).   
154. Daley, 487 A.2d at 323. 
155. Id.  
156. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are 
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many Caribbean individuals speak English, not all are United States citizens.  In fact, 
the United States administers over only three out of numerous English-speaking 
islands that are located in the Caribbean.157  Therefore, the court’s belief that citizens 
speak English attests to the core belief that fluency in English is a sign of 
citizenship.158  Additionally, in Proulx, the attorney knew he was from Canada.159  
However, the court refused to acknowledge that birth outside the United States was 
sufficient evidence to show noncitizenship or render further inquiry.  However, what 
is also transparent is the fact that the defendant was white and spoke English.   It is 
acutely apparent that courts, while not willing to use stereotypical factors to show 
alienage, reinforce stereotypes of citizenship when making their determinations 
under this analysis.160  In the courts’ refusal to hold to society’s stereotypes of who is 
a noncitizen, the courts’ continue to maintain and reinforce society’s stereotype and 
assumptions of who is a citizen and who belongs.  Therefore, the outcome is the 
same; individuals are subjectively perceived as either foreign or citizen. 
However, neither factors used by society to assume citizenship nor 
determine foreignness can be used in assessing whether an attorney should 
reasonably have known that his or her client was not a citizen.  Nearly all immigrants 
who come to the Unites States at a young age speak English as a first language and 
are fully socialized into the dominant culture.161 Approximately 650,000 foreign-
born individuals naturalize each year.162  Almost two million United States citizens 
born abroad to American parent(s) were reported in the 2000 United States 
Census.163 The census also reported that 12.5 million naturalized citizens were living 
in the United States and 18.5 million noncitizens were living in the U.S.164 
Therefore, there are thirty-one million people in this country that were born in a 
foreign country and nearly half of them are citizens.   
Neither citizenship nor alienage can be distinguished by looking at 
individuals, observing their mannerisms for signs of “assimilation,” knowing their 
place of birth, determining their first language, or hearing their accent or lack 
 
Models of Membership Self-fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1998) (examining cultural 
assimilation into America, including the importance of speaking English as a first language). 
157. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, Commw. & Territories of the United 
States, http://www.doi.gov/oia/Firstpginfo/islandfactsheet.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
158. This is an interesting observation because many Caribbean Islanders speak English, but 
not all are United States citizens.  See More Caribbean Nationals Becoming U.S. Citizens, NEW AM. 
MEDIA, Apr. 1, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.blacktino.net/index.php?option=com_content&task 
=view&id= 3575&Itemid=9). 
159.  Proulx, 422 So.2d at 1097. 
160. For a discussion on the use of case law to reinforce racial hierarchy, see generally Ian F. 
Haney Lopez, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1850-1990  (New York Univ. Press 
1996) (analyzing cases applying the naturalization prerequisite that a noncitizen be “white”); MICHAEL 
OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM 1960’S TO THE 1980’S  
(1986) (discussing the historical legal and political formation of race); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial 
Hierarchy, Asian American and Latinos as “Foreigners,” and Social Change:  Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 
OR. L. REV. 347, (1997) (discussing the limitations that new laws and the court system will have in 
diminishing racial hierarchy based upon a historical perspective).   
161. Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 156, at 3. 
162. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER: A PEW RESEARCH CENTER PROJECT, 
REPORT: GROWING SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS CHOOSING NATURALIZATION 1, 6 (2007), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/74.pdf. 
163. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 (2000). 
164. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/10/2010  1:25 AM 
2010] ADVISING NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS  57 
thereof.  The reinforced stereotypes continue to incorrectly differentiate between 
citizens and noncitizens and impede the equal treatment of all individuals in society.  
It also does nothing to assist in the necessary investigation of status and fails to assist 
in the determination of a Sixth Amendment violation under jurisdictions that use the 
“knew or should have known” criteria.  
Furthering the argument against this holding, courts have placed the burden 
on the client to inform his attorney about his immigration status to find a violation 
under the Sixth Amendment.  In many of the courts’ holdings, defendants were 
admonished for their failure to inform their attorney of their immigration status.  For 
example, in Daley, the court made sure to comment that the defendant failed to 
inform his attorney that he was not a citizen.165  An additional point, in which the 
court focused its opinion, was that he was aware that he must “obey the laws” and, 
therefore, should have known that his conviction would have jeopardized his 
immigration status.166  While the court in Proulx did not directly admonish the 
defendant, they did incorporate his cross-examination by the assistant state’s attorney 
into their opinion, which attempted to establish his knowledge that he was not an 
American citizen.167  Again, in State v. Muriithi, the court blamed the defendant for 
failing to inform his counsel that he was not a United States citizen.  In response to 
the argument that the defendant was not aware that the conviction would have 
immigration consequences, the court stated that “he did, however, know he was not a 
citizen and never conveyed that fact to his counsel.”168  Concluding that, “even 
though the defendant may not have been aware of the immigration consequences, he 
knew that he wasn’t a citizen and, therefore, should have known that a criminal 
violation could impact his ability to stay in this country.”169   
The above holdings illustrate the refusal for courts to recognize both the 
duty of the attorney to his client and his role in the system.  Defendants are given a 
Sixth Amendment right because they are not expected to be educated in the law.170  
The requirement that the defendant know that their immigration status could be 
affected by his or her plea of guilty fails to take into account the very core of the 
attorney-client relationship and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  It is the 
client who may know the facts, but it is the lawyer who knows the law.   
Currently, an attorney can escape a Sixth Amendment violation simply by 
refraining from asking about the immigration status of his client.  The created “Don’t 
Ask” policy runs counter to the desired balance in an attorney-client relationship.  It 
fails to obligate the attorney to fulfill his duties to his client to investigate and 
determine the needs and goals of the client.  It fails to hold the attorney to his 
obligation to protect his client from harm, to advocate on his behalf, and to utilize his 
capacity as the individual educated by the system and the law.  The goals of the 
client many times are not known to him, because the client is unfamiliar with the 
choices he has and the possible effects of his decision.  It is the attorney who has the 
 
165.  Daley, 487 A.2d at 323. 
166.   Id. 
167.   Proulx, 422 So.2d. at 1097. 
168.  Muriithi, 46 P.3d at 1151. 
169.  Id. 
                  170.   Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1963) (stating that “the right to be heard 
would be …of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent 
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law… He requires the guiding 
hand of counsel …). 
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knowledge and expertise to advise the client of the possible goals.  Attorneys are 
trained to interview a client, educated to know more about the law than the client, 
and charged with looking out for the best interests of the client.  Restraint may shield 
the attorney from delving into an unfamiliar area of law, from further overburdening 
the attorney who may already have a heavy caseload, and from a Sixth Amendment 
violation.  However, it does nothing to put faith in the court criminal system as it 
deteriorates the attorney-client relationship, the system’s perception of fairness, and 
society’s sense of justice. 
III.  DEFENSE COUNSEL’S OBLIGATIONS TO THE CLIENT ARE MET USING 
ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS  
Although the Sixth Amendment has been the overwhelming framework for 
claims of “failure to advise” as to the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction, attorney ethics have been largely overlooked when determining 
responsibility to the client/defendant.  Carl Schurz once said, “[i]deals are like stars; 
you will not succeed in touching them with your hands.  But like the seafaring man 
on a desert of waters, you choose them as your guide, and following them you will 
reach your destiny.”171  Many scholars agree that defense lawyers should look to 
both their lawyering role and to ethical norms to guide their obligations pertaining to 
collateral consequences.172  
Very little guidance or definition is given to the true responsibilities 
obligatory to defense counsel, especially in terms of counseling and pleas. All 
definitions are vague. An attorney finds little comfort in trying to find the answer to 
a question he may have on how to act in a given situation.  This is especially true 
when certain obligations or duties conflict with each other or with court decisions. 
Professor Hazard said it best when he wrote, “[o]ne can say that serious ethical 
dilemmas usually involve, not questions of distinguishing right from wrong, but 
deciding upon the priority between obligations emanating from different normative 
realms that dictate inconsistent courses of action.”173 The question is how we resolve, 
accommodate, or somehow adjust to these inconsistencies.174  Here, the “inconsistent 
courses of action” arise between the current Sixth Amendment holdings as to the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction and the ethical obligations that 
an attorney has to his client, the court system, and society.175 Currently, Sixth 
Amendment holdings are allowing defense attorneys to avoid counseling their clients 
on immigration consequences of their criminal conviction while fully acknowledging 
that noncitizen defendants are suffering increasingly harsh immigration penalties as a 
result of the lack of advisement during their criminal proceedings.  So who wins: 
court interpretations of the Sixth Amendment or the client?  
The determination of an attorney’s duty is not solved only with the current 
 
171. Carl Schurz, born in 1829, died in 1906, was a German-born, United States citizen, who 
became a general in the United States Army for the Union in the American Civil War, and an American 
politician. 
172. See Pinard, supra note 112, at 1083.   
173. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Ethics and Mystery, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 509, 512 
(2005).   
174. Id. at 513. 
175. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, 8; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, PREAMBLE 1 (1983). 
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analysis of the Sixth Amendment but with the assistance of an attorney’s ethical 
duties.  Historically, a counselor’s priority was to mitigate the client’s suffering, 
previously defined as imprisonment or financial penalties.176  Currently, all attorney 
obligations are not only based on the law but also on other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social, and political factors that may be relevant to the client’s 
situation.177  Rules do not “exhaust the moral and ethical consideration…for no 
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.”178  The key is 
the client and the client’s goals, including immigration consequences.179 
A.  Attorney’s Duty to the Client 
The attorney-client relationship is at the heart of lawyering.  Without legal 
counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through 
counsel that the accused secures his or her rights.180  The Supreme Court stated 
plainly that “[t]he right of one charged with a crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”181  The 
right to counsel also attaches to a guilty plea since it is a “critical” stage of the 
process.182  The Court has held that “[c]ounsel’s concern is the faithful representation 
of the interest of [the] client.”183   
To further emphasize the attorney-client relationship as the basis on which 
attorneys are defined, one need only to look at another functional definition of an 
attorney.  The function of the defense attorney is to “serve as the accused’s counselor 
and advocate with courage and devotion and to render effective, quality 
representation.”184  To do that, a lawyer should represent a client “zealously” and 
“competently.”185  To properly perform this duty, the attorney must communicate, 
investigate, and advise the client.186  Attorneys who are disciplined for such 
 
                  176.   AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND 
CHANCES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 
STRATEGIES 40, 41 (2007) [hereinafter SECOND CHANCES]. 
177. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983) (amended 2003).  
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE 16 (1983). 
179. See SECOND CHANCES, supra note 176, at 41. 
180. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (citations omitted). 
181. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
182. See Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 
60 (1963).  
183. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268 (1973). In Tollett, the majority noted: 
 
The principal value of counsel to the accused in a criminal prosecution often 
does not lie in counsel’s ability to recite a list of possible defenses in the 
abstract, nor in his ability, if time permitted, to amass a large quantum of 
factual data and inform the defendant of it.…Often the interests of the accused 
are not advanced by challenges that would only delay the inevitable date of 
prosecution, or by contesting all guilt. Id. at 267-68 (citation omitted). 
 
184. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-1.2(b) (1993). 
 185. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 1.1 (2007) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for 
the representation.”). 
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4 (2007). 
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violations have broken the cardinal ethical rule – never pursue one’s “self-interest to 
the detriment of [a] client’s interest.”187   
“Zealous” and “competent” representation, as with all functions and 
responsibilities, must have a goal.  One overarching goal is that an attorney, as an 
advocate, ensures that the defendant receives justice.  However, justice is an 
ambiguous concept with goals and priorities based on the individual’s wishes and 
desires.  In this instance, under the attorney-client relationship, the goals of “justice” 
for the case should be set by the client and respected by the attorney.188  The attorney 
must abide by the client’s decision and consult with him concerning how the client 
would like his objectives pursued.189  However, all decisions by the client must be 
made only after the attorney has done his or her best to inform the client of the 
relevant considerations.190  The objectives, relevant considerations, and goals of the 
client are not categorized in terms of “collateral” and “direct” under ethical 
obligations, but as those that are “deemed important by defense counsel or the 
defendant.”191  In fact, a lawyer may not unreasonably limit the focus or objective of 
his representation, or limit representation without the consent of his client.192   
In addition to overall general ethical obligations and considerations, the 
ABA Standards of Criminal Justice seek to reinforce the duty to the client.  Under 
these standards, the attorney has an obligation to advise the client according to the 
client’s objectives, including collateral consequences.193  The Standards’ reasoning 
does not stray from that of most scholars, academics, and even courts – many times 
immigration consequences are the defendant’s greatest concern, and, therefore, 
create a responsibility for defense counsel to investigate and advise clients 
concerning such matters.194   
B.  Attorney’s Duty to the Legal System  
An attorney’s duty is also to the legal system.  Our adversarial system 
functions on the belief that opposing viewpoints must be zealously advocated in 
front of a neutral arbitrator in order to succeed.195  The adversarial system is 
defended as the best way to protect the rights of each side and to pursue the truth.196  
In the court system, the judge has a duty to ensure that both the rights of the 
 
187. Stephen Wizner, Rationing Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1019, 1025 (1997). 
188. John Burkoff, Criminal Defense Ethics: Law and Liability §5:4 (2d ed. 2010). 
189. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983). 
190. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.4(b) (1983) (amended 2007). 
191. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(b) (1999). 
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (1983) (amended 2007). 
193. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(b) (“To aid the defendant 
in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the 
alternatives available and address considerations deemed important by defense counsel or the defendant in 
reaching a decision.”); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(f) (“To the extent 
possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry 
of any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated 
plea.”). 
194. Id. 14-3.2(f) cmt. 
195. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
EC 7-19 (1980). 
196. Rhode, supra note 111, at 642.  
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defendant and the interests of society are protected;197 the prosecutor has a duty to 
punish a crime without undue harshness and to seek justice based on societal 
interests;198 and the defense attorney has a duty to ensure that his client receives a 
just outcome while acting respectfully and upholding the legal process.199  Therefore, 
“[t]he duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to 
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.”200  
Since our adversarial system is based on zealous advocacy from both sides, 
it is insightful to know the ethical obligations and responsibilities the prosecution 
owes to the legal system.  A prosecutor’s function is to seek justice and advocate on 
behalf of societal interests.201  The prosecutor has complete discretion when deciding 
whether to charge an individual with a crime and, if charged, whether to offer the 
individual a plea and under what terms.202 With complete discretion comes 
responsibility.203  Robert M.A. Johnson, former president of the National District 
Attorneys Association, stated that prosecutors should understand all consequences 
that stem from a criminal conviction.204  Mr. Johnson understood that justice cannot 
be served if the prosecutor does not understand all the possible effects of the plea 
offer on the defendant because the plea must be proportionate to the crime in order to 
seek justice; this includes immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.205  For 
this reason, in recent years, prosecutors have become increasingly aware of 
immigration consequences.  Prosecutors, therefore, have obligations regarding 
immigration in courtrooms.     
Currently, criminal prosecutors along with local police officers increasingly 
are given the responsibility, duty, and mission to assist in the removal of the 
defendant from this country during criminal proceedings.206  Meanwhile, defendants 
are still deprived of receiving advice about immigration consequences.  The current 
Sixth Amendment holdings, that refuse to require attorneys to counsel defendants, 
create an imbalance in our criminal justice system by failing to oppose the zealous 
advocacy by the prosecution on the issue of immigration with zealous advocacy by 
the criminal defense attorney.  Permitting the government to enforce immigration 
laws that are affected by criminal convictions in criminal court, but not obligating 
assistance in the prevention of deportation of noncitizen defendants goes against our 
balanced adversarial structure, as well as a civilized society’s sense of justice.  A 
right to protection from government abuse is worthless when there is no attorney at 
 
197. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 6-1.1(a) 
(2000). 
198. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-1.2(b)-(c) (1993). 
199. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE 5. 
200. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1983). 
201. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-1.2(b)-(c).  
                  202.   See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 703, 734-36 (2008). 
                  203.   See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private 
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 427-36 (2009). 
204. Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, THE PROSECUTOR, May-June 2001, 
available at http://www.ndaa.org/ndaa/about/president_message_may_june_2001.html. 
205. Id. 
                  206.  See U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement, programs 
such as Operation Community Shield, Memorandum Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to 
Enhance Safety and Security, Criminal Alien Program, Delegation of Immigration Authority 287(g), 
Rapid REPAT, Secure Communities, available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/topics/. 
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the defendant’s side willing to fight for those protections.207  
C.  Attorney’s Duty to Society 
A defense attorney, as an individual in society, has a “special responsibility 
for the quality of justice” and “should seek to reform and improve the administration 
of criminal justice.”208  “When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or 
procedural law come to defense counsel’s attention, he or she should stimulate 
efforts for remedial action.”209  It is the attorney’s duty to improve the law and the 
legal system.210  Under this set of duties and responsibilities, attorneys have a duty to 
seek change and reform the system.   
D.  Incorporation of Ethical Standards into the Sixth Amendment 
 As stated, an attorney’s main duty is to the client.  However, court 
decisions, and heavy court dockets have watered down that duty. Legal 
reinforcement and intervention may be needed for lawyers to start to see their clients 
within their role as legally-obligated individuals, whose responsibility includes a 
commitment to fulfill a duty to their client, the court, and society.  It is too hard to 
escape the reality that lawyers fail to conduct an adequate investigation of their 
client’s status because of a conflict between their own self-interest for fear of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the existence of a burdensome caseload, and 
the availability of Sixth Amendment case law to support their decision to remain 
silent on the subject. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has made clear that what is ethically 
required of criminal defense attorneys may not be the same as what is 
constitutionally required as a matter of effective assistance of counsel.211  Therefore, 
courts had not looked to ABA Standards in a way that complement the Sixth 
Amendment.  The Court has however given a glimmer of hope to those who have 
long awaited a Sixth Amendment analysis that could harmoniously coexist with 
ethical standards and the true duty of zealous advocacy to clients.  The Court in 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla incorporated the use of ethical standards in its Sixth 
Amendment analysis.212  In these cases, the Court used the ABA Standards of 
Criminal Justice as “norms” in determining that counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.213  In addition to the Court’s ruling in these 
matters, other courts have seriously considered ethical standards in determining what 
the norm consists of, which in turn has resulted in an increased recognition of Sixth 
Amendment violations.214   
 
207. Rhode, supra note 111, at 643. 
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE 1; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-1.2(b) (1993). 
209. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-1.2(b). 
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE 1, 6, 7. 
211. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89; Nix v. Whiteside, 475 US. 157, 166-67 (1986); Burkoff, 
supra note 188, §3:9. 
212. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 362; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 
388-89. 
213. Id. 
214. See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s like Déjà Vu All Over Again:” Williams 
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the 
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The emphasis of ethical rules when conducting the Sixth Amendment 
analysis has also occurred in the context of immigration consequences.  The 
Supreme Court recognized that removal from the United States is often a greater 
imposition than a criminal sentence.215  Although the Court has not made a formal 
determination as to whether there is a duty to advise of immigration consequences 
under the Sixth Amendment or of an objective standard of reasonableness based on 
immigration consequences, in INS v. St. Cyr, the Court suggested, in dicta, that 
“competent” attorneys should advise clients of the immigration consequences of 
their plea.216 In commenting on this, the Court acknowledged that noncitizen 
defendants could be more concerned with their right to remain in the country than 
their potential jail sentence, if they knew, and agreed that the defendant’s decision on 
whether to plea or not could be based on the immigration consequences and on the 
possibility of relief in immigration court.217  The Court reinforced the importance of 
ethical standards by adding that if the defendant were not aware of the immigration 
consequences, “competent” counsel would have advised him on this information and 
look to the advice of numerous practice guides to make that determination.218  
Other courts have followed that reasoning and have held that deportation is 
a legitimate factor that would enter the decision-making process of a defendant of 
whether to plead guilty or go to trial.219  Therefore, some courts have begun to reject 
the collateral consequence rule in its Sixth Amendment analysis and have looked at 
ethical rules to determine the duty of an attorney to the client.220  In doing so, courts 
have looked to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 14-3.2(f) when 
determining the first prong of the Strickland standard or when examining “prevailing 
norms of practice.”221 
The above determinations are consistent with the courts’ own ethical duties 
to the criminal system.  Under the ABA Standards, courts are encouraged to ensure 
that defense counsel are aware of, and can fulfill, their obligation to determine and 
advise a defendant about the immigration consequences of a plea.222  In fact, through 
legislation and/or ethical rules, courts are under an obligation to inform a defendant 
that a plea may affect his immigration status and allow him time to speak with his 
counsel if additional information is requested.223   
In order to fulfill these obligations and responsibilities, judges have their 
own guides and handbooks to assist them on the issue of immigration in the criminal 
 
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 155-62 (2007). 
215. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945) (stating that the “impact of deportation upon 
the life of an alien is often as great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence. A deported 
alien may lose his family, his friends and his livelihood forever…Return to his native land may result in 
poverty, persecution and even death.”).  
                  216.   St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 333 n.50. 
                  217.  Id. at 323. 
218.   Id.  
219. E.g., Williams, 641 N.E.2d at 49 (“Deportation may be a penalty more severe than a 
prison sentence.”).  
220. E.g., Id.; Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805; Soriano, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1481. 
221. Id. 
222. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, A JUDGE’S BENCHBOOK ON IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND RELATED MATTERS (C. Wolchok & A. Brown eds., 2001) (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY (1999)) [hereinafter SULLIVAN]. 
223. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-1.4(c) (1999). 
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courtroom.224  Judges use these guides and handbooks to educate themselves on 
immigration law.225  However, even if this specific information did not exist, judges 
can use any information they deem important.226  In sentencing, judges must make a 
determination that achieves justice.  Again, according to ethical duties, justice cannot 
be accomplished without both parties being present and engaged in that 
determination.227 If the court believes the defendant does not have effective 
assistance of counsel, the court cannot accept a plea.228  Therefore, courts have an 
obligation to ensure that immigration consequences are advised on by the attorney. 
The argument that judges may not use a defendant’s immigration status to 
aid in their final determination, or that immigration status is irrelevant, is neither true 
nor accurate.  Currently, immigration consequences have increasingly come within 
the criminal judges’ purview as exemplified by: the increasing number of cases 
across the country that seek plea withdrawal based on failure to be advised as to the 
immigration consequences by both the criminal court and defense counsel; the fact 
that judges have the capacity to order deportation; the court’s responsibility, in many 
states, to inform the client of the immigration consequences at the time of plea; and 
the judge’s ability to use immigration status to determine detention, bond, and 
pretrial-motions.  Therefore, archaic beliefs and case law cannot be maintained if the 
goals of our system are to remain intact.  
CONCLUSION 
As Karl Llewellyn stated, “It is the profession that keeps the law alive.”229  
A lawyer “can either set himself across the path of progress, he can either check or 
block, by the exercise of utmost ingenuity, each new forward step.  Or he can do the 
opposite.”230  It is this progress, the ability to choose the needs of the client over the 
law of the courts that will be the only answer to the movement of the law as it 
currently stands.   
With the increased resources of the Department of Homeland Security, 
improved access to criminal records, Congress’s harsher laws on crime, and 
increased cooperation from local law enforcement, probation and parole officers, the 
need for lawyers to assist their noncitizen clients in matters affecting their ability to 
remain in this country is the responsibility of their defense attorney.  Therefore, 
attorneys must “step up” and counsel their clients on the immigration consequences 
of a criminal conviction. Defense attorneys cannot ethically turn a blind eye to the 
inadequacies and injustice of the current interpretation of the Sixth Amendment to 
their noncitizen client’s detriment.  When there is a conflict within the bounds of the 
law, an attorney should resolve it in favor of the interests of his or her client.  To do 
 
224. A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 4-7 (Pamela 
Goldberg & Carol Leslie Wolchok eds., 2004) [hereinafter JUDGE’S GUIDE]; see SULLIVAN, supra note 
222. 
225. JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 224. 
226. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (“As a general proposition, a 
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Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).  
227. JUDGE’S GUIDE, supra note 224. 
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otherwise runs afoul of an attorney’s duty to his or her client, the criminal system, 
and society.   
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